The Absence of Legal Status for the Russian Federation and Its Representative in the IMF
The absence of legal status for the RF in the IMF is the opening thesis of the Academy’s lecture of 27 August 2026. The lecturer maintains that Ksenia Yudaeva’s rights and claims as the RF trading company’s representative in the Fund did not arise and do not exist. He connects this with the claim that the backing for currency code 643 did not enter the proposed three-year period of IMF administration ending in 2026.
The Academy characterises the Bank of Russia’s presence on an external balance sheet identified in the source as “MIP, 1991” and Yudaeva’s introduction as its balance-sheet holder as an unlawful act that should be recognised as an international state crime and a war crime. The lecturer connects IMF inaction with harm to Soviet sovereign interests. The lecture does not describe an international criminal judgment already delivered.
It is telling that the International Monetary Fund, by recognising Ksenia Yudaeva as the representative of the Russian Federation and its trading company as an already closed aerial trading post, thereby assumed obligations towards the Soviet Union. These obligations include handing over to the extraordinary sovereign authorities, the state authorities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all income and annuities received from the deposit made by the trading company ‘Russian Federation’ of the entire volume of withdrawn currency under code 810 SUR and its backing on the balance sheets of the International Monetary Fund, calculated at 8% per annum. The sum resulting from this calculation is astronomical in scale. In addition, the IMF is obliged to transfer the gold backing of the Russian rouble as the currency under code 643 to the USSR State Bank, at a rate of 9 grams of gold of 999 fineness for every Russian rouble, and unconditionally, without additional demands, to transfer its entire balance sheet, backing and claims denominated in special drawing rights to Soviet control.
Annulment of the Rouble Currency Area (Code 643) and Its Failure to Pass into IMF Administration
The cessation of the Russian rouble currency area under code 643 (roubles) did not result in its transfer to the administrative control of the International Monetary Fund, to which it was supposed to have been transferred for three years — until the end of 2026. This event has not been registered and has been annulled by international financial observers and regulators. Thus, the backing securing the currency under code 643 did not come under the IMF’s control, and the currency area itself did not come under the Fund’s administration.
The asserted absence of Yudaeva’s rights and the lack of a registered transfer of the backing for currency code 643 appear in the same passage. The Academy connects these points with its assessment of RF status in the IMF without describing a separate judicial mechanism annulling every action by the representative.
The external balance sheet and Yudaeva’s role are assessed within the same Academy position: the lecturer calls for the relevant actions to be recognised as an international state crime and a war crime. “MIP, 1991” is retained as the transcript’s designation.
The lecture calls on the IMF, having recognised Yudaeva as a representative, to transfer income and annuities on the 810 SUR deposit to Soviet authorities at 8% per annum. It demands transfer to the USSR State Bank of the backing for currency code 643 at 9 grams of 999-fine gold per rouble. Separately, the lecturer demands transfer of the entire balance sheet, backing and claims in Special Drawing Rights.
The IMF’s Obligations towards the USSR: Income from the 810 SUR Deposit and the Gold Backing of the Rouble
By recognising Ksenia Yudaeva as the representative of the closed trading company ‘Russian Federation’, the International Monetary Fund thereby assumed obligations towards the Soviet Union. This is not a declaration of intent but a consequence with legal significance: having admitted to participation in its system a person whose rights and claims did not arise, do not arise and do not exist, the IMF is obliged to hand over to the extraordinary sovereign authorities of the USSR everything received from the deposit made by the trading company ‘Russian Federation’ of the entire volume of withdrawn currency under code 810 SUR and its backing on the Fund’s balance sheets. This means the full amount of income and annuities accrued on this deposit at 8% per annum. As noted in the Academy’s materials, the sum is astronomical, and it must be returned unconditionally to Soviet control.
The lecturer associates currency code 810 SUR with a deposit made by the RF trading company on the IMF’s balance sheets. The lecture demands transfer of the income and annuities from that deposit to the extraordinary sovereign authorities of the USSR.
The second demand concerns the gold backing of the Russian rouble under code 643: the lecture gives 9 grams of 999-fine gold per rouble and identifies the USSR State Bank as recipient. This figure is distinct from the separately stated 0.98 grams of gold per Soviet rouble.
In addition to the income from the 810 SUR deposit and the gold backing of the rouble under code 643, the International Monetary Fund is obliged unconditionally, without additional demands, to transfer its entire balance sheet, backing and claims denominated in special drawing rights to Soviet control.
Thus, the IMF’s obligations towards the USSR comprise several elements: income and annuities from the 810 SUR deposit calculated at 8% per annum; the gold backing of the rouble under code 643, to be transferred to the USSR State Bank at a rate of 9 grams of gold of 999 fineness per rouble; and the entire balance sheet, backing and claims denominated in special drawing rights. All these elements must be transferred unconditionally to the extraordinary sovereign authorities of the USSR. Failure to fulfil these obligations places IMF officials and persons acting in their stead in the position of persons declared outlaws, since their inaction diminishes and affects the sovereign rights and other interests of the Soviet Union.
Annulment of the Trading Company ‘Russian Federation’ and the Russian Ministry of Finance’s Loss of Registration
The lecturer identifies 20 July 2026 as the final stage in the annulment of the former RF trading company as a trading post on Soviet territory. The stated basis is the Ministry of Finance’s definitive loss of registration in the global banking and financial system.
The precursors to this outcome emerged as early as 2023, when the Russian Ministry of Finance suspended auctions of federal loan bonds. The reason was that the trading company ‘Russian Federation’ had failed to borrow money and had failed to prove its existence as a joint-stock company within the global banking and financial system.
The lecture describes Order No. 2655 of 24 September 2024 as unsigned and legally invalid. The lecturer connects this assessment with the claimed absence of the Russian charter-based jurisdiction’s right to deal in gold backing, gold or its value.
The foregoing demonstrates and confirms that the Russian charter-based jurisdiction has no right to conduct dealings in gold backing or gold in general, or to trade in gold. Moreover, not only are such dealings absent, but so too is the right to conduct dealings in its value. This means that any actions aimed at disposing of Soviet gold fall outside the bounds of lawful competence and produce no legally significant consequences for the Soviet Union or its sovereign rights. The Russian charter-based jurisdiction has neither the title nor the powers that would allow it lawfully to enter into transactions involving gold backing.
Under the sovereign claims of the Soviet Union, the International Monetary Fund bears subsidiary liability for the export of this gold from Russia and any dealings in it. Under international law, the unlawful foreign acquirer, who is also the recipient and custodian of Soviet gold, bears joint and several liability for the return of Soviet gold with compensation (a treaty-based penalty).
Thus, the annulment of the trading company ‘Russian Federation’ as a trading post and the loss of its Ministry of Finance’s registration in the global banking and financial system are accomplished legal facts. Order No. 2655 of 24 September 2024 has no legal force, and the Russian charter-based jurisdiction has been deprived of the right to conduct dealings in gold backing and gold. Liability for unlawful dealings in Soviet gold rests with the International Monetary Fund and the foreign acquirer in accordance with international law. These circumstances have a direct bearing on the protection of the Soviet Union’s sovereign rights and the restoration of lawful arrangements concerning Soviet gold.
Liability of the IMF and foreign acquirers for Soviet gold
Under the Soviet sovereign claims presented by the Academy, the IMF bears subsidiary liability for the export of and dealings in Soviet gold. The unlawful foreign acquirer, recipient and custodian is identified as bearing joint and several liability for its return with compensation—a treaty-based penalty.
The lecture calls for the return of the gold together with compensation. It does not make compensation conditional solely on the impossibility of return in kind, nor does it specify a procedure for simultaneous claims against the acquirer and the IMF.
The legal basis for this liability is the Russian charter-based jurisdiction’s lack of any right to conduct dealings in gold backing or gold in general. Order No. 2655 of 24 September 2024 has the status of an unsigned order and is legally invalid, and therefore produces no legal consequences for dealings in Soviet gold. The Ministry of Finance of the trading company ‘Russian Federation’ has definitively and irrevocably lost its registration in the global banking and financial system, confirming that it has no lawful authority whatsoever to dispose of Soviet gold.
Thus, liability for Soviet gold is distributed between two entities: the International Monetary Fund bears subsidiary liability, while the unlawful foreign acquirer, who is also the recipient and custodian of Soviet gold, bears joint and several liability for the return of the gold with a treaty-based penalty.
The 1961 monetary reform, the rouble’s gold backing and obligations under the 49-year deposit
From 1 January 1961, the issuance of Soviet money, which began in 1947, was brought under the backing of a deposit in gold and placed on deposit at face value for 49 years for the benefit of the Soviet Union and exclusively for the benefit of the sovereign citizens of the USSR as the victorious people. This was carried out under the guise of a monetary reform, in the form of a redenomination accompanied by devaluation at a ratio of 10 to 1, and the replacement of banknotes with banknotes of the 1961 issue. The outwardly identical banknotes of the 1991 issue, however, have no gold backing: they were issued by Yeltsin and by Gerashchenko on his instructions.
The lecturer links USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 470 of 4 May 1960, “On Changing the Scale of Prices and Replacing the Money Currently in Circulation with New Money,” to the CPSU Central Committee’s initiative and the 1961 reform. The lecture characterises the reform as confiscatory and gives income of 124,369 tonnes of 999-fine gold.
The sum of 14 billion Soviet roubles at face value and at an exchange rate of 0.98 grams of gold, declared to be the value of the rights to lease Soviet land and to remain within the territory of the USSR for 30 years (in a geographical coordinate system not based on title), was declared to be the collateral value of 14 billion Soviet roubles that were to be returned by 2021. The Russian Federation, acting as a commercial agent, evaded this repayment.
Separately, the lecturer discusses an extension of the German Reich trust, refusal to capitulate in 2016, and expected completion of the relevant procedures in 2026. The transcript’s references to 23 September, an additional month and 72 hours do not yield an unambiguous calendar calculation. Relative to the lecture’s August date, the September events remain the lecturer’s forecast.
This part of the lecture retains distinct amounts and periods: a 49-year deposit relating to the 1947 issue, the 10:1 currency replacement in 1961, and a separate 14-billion-Soviet-rouble amount for 30 years of territorial use, due for return by 2021. The Academy links these to claims against the RF trading company without treating them as the same agreement.
Annulment of monetary aggregates M1 and M2, seizure of deposits and obligations towards the USSR State Bank
The lecture of 27 August 2026 forecasts the final closure of the debt-rouble currency area by September 2026. In the same passage, M1 and M2 are described as annulled and seized, with confiscated gold-rouble deposits exceeding 67 trillion. Monetary aggregates M1 and M2 are distinct from the International Sovereign Treasury M1.
Following the withdrawal of M1 and M2, aggregate M0 retains a different purpose. It attests exclusively to the issuance and trading of Bank of Russia shares and to payments on their debt obligations. What is involved is not currency, but debt obligations and underlying instruments—convertible ordinary shares and municipal bonds. In other words, M0 reflects the corporate debt nature of the Bank of Russia’s obligations, rather than gold-backed money issuance.
The annulment of M1 and M2 resulted from the Soviet rouble currency area being declared closed and its monetary aggregates being unlawfully placed as Russian deposits and savings in funds and banks within the global banking and financial system, earning interest ranging from 4% (in Zurich and at Deutsche Bank) to 16% per annum. These savings and deposits were accepted fraudulently, on the grounds that the Soviet Union had supposedly ceased to exist as a subject of international law. That interpretation, however, was rejected: 16 UN legal committees did not accept it. Accordingly, the Sovereign International Treasury M1 annulled the accounts in which these funds were held, while the banks that had accepted the deposits for 30 years, until the end of 2025, lost their rights to them before the term expired.
The key event determining the liability of the United States and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel was the confirmation by the UN General Assembly and the UN Secretariat in September 2024 of the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a permanent member of the UN Security Council under Article 23 of the UN Charter and as a founding member of the Organisation. The lecturer connects this event with the statutory subsidiary liability of the United States, as the controller and supervisor of the global banking system, and of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. They are obliged to close all deposits and savings relating to all monetary aggregates in funds and banks within the global financial system, unconditionally return to the Sovereign International Treasury M1, in gold currency, the value of the holdings represented by the monetary aggregates of the Soviet rouble currency area, and pay the USSR State Bank in Moscow all interest income and annuities received during wartime from the global banking and financial system.
The lecture assigns banks’ and funds’ deposit-servicing charges to the digital government of the RF and to Armenia in the policyholder role identified by the lecturer. This allocation concerns the named entities, not all people of any nationality.
The fate of citizens’ deposits is of particular importance. From July 1992, each citizen received an annual loan of 5000 Soviet roubles from the Soviet Union’s budget and the funds of the USSR State Bank, with 1 rouble equal to 0.98 grams of gold of 999 fineness. The sum of 2000 roubles was repayable within 12 months at 3% interest per annum, while the remaining 3000 roubles was issued for a term of up to 24 months, with repayment beginning on the date the loan was issued and interest charged at 2% per annum. The Bank of Russia received this interest annually and held it on deposit at 8% per annum. However, the Central Bank itself evaded and refused payments and repayment of the specified loan, declaring to international regulators that the Soviet loan, its deposit and accumulated interest had been spent on the needs of the digital public authorities, pension and social funds, compulsory health insurance, the issuance and cancellation of consumer loans, renovation and purposes other than those intended. This explanation does not extinguish the debt: the Soviet loan cannot be written off, forgiven or cancelled by the trading company ‘Russian Federation’ and is charged to that company as a debt by way of recourse, to be covered by insurance payments from its policyholders.
At the date of the lecture, the lecturer anticipates insolvency and bankruptcy from 2 September 2026 and future liability of the Bank of Russia and its policyholders for the deposit and interest before a Soviet military tribunal. Separately, he describes the seizure from late June 2026 of funds for continuing the annual Soviet loan from entities termed “Greater Armenia” in the source and their international policyholders. Neither a judgment already delivered nor individual payment to every citizen is described.
Thus, the annulment of monetary aggregates M1 and M2, the seizure of savings and deposits in gold roubles amounting to more than 67 trillion, and the establishment of subsidiary liability on the part of the United States and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel form a single legal framework. It is intended to restore the gold backing of the Soviet currency and return to the Sovereign International Treasury M1 the value of the monetary aggregates of the Soviet rouble currency area. The USSR State Bank in Moscow acquires the right to claim all interest income and annuities, while the Soviet Union confirms and establishes for all UN members their quotas in world money, recorded in dual accounts. For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this provides a basis for continuing to explain to the public the legal and financial mechanisms for protecting sovereign interests.
