Employees of Sberbank — from ordinary bank clerks to senior executives — are not merely hired workers, but accomplices in large-scale criminal activity. They bear personal criminal liability for fraudulent lending to the public, trading in tangible assets, forging securities, leaking personal data and conducting unlawful transactions through accounts 40702 and 40703. Moreover, Sberbank’s senior management is involved in an organised criminal organisation (OPS) together with the Federal Tax Service (FTS), judges and the Federal Bailiff Service (FSSP).
For context: Sberbank is the largest bank in the Russian Federation, registered as a public joint-stock company (PJSC). However, as established by documents of the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), the entire banking system of the Russian Federation is unlawful because it operates on the basis of fraudulent regulations and in the interests of commercial entities rather than USSR citizens. Account 40702 is opened for resident non-state commercial organisations, while account 40703 is for non-profit organisations. These very accounts are used to cash out funds, evade taxes and finance the shadow economy.
Bank clerks and managers are convicted criminals serving custodial sentences
Crimes committed by Sberbank employees are substantiated by criminal cases and court judgments. In the Tver Region, a female Sberbank clerk stole 9,8 million roubles from customers’ accounts in 2008–2010. She forged a cheque and a customer’s signature. The court sentenced her to 5,5 years in a general-regime penal colony and a fine of 150 thousand roubles.
In Zelenograd, a female employee took out loans in the names of ten customers without their knowledge. The losses totalled 716 thousand roubles. In Kabardino-Balkaria, M. Kh. Shogenov, the head of an internal Sberbank unit, was convicted of fraud involving 4,95 million roubles through abuse of his official position. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
For context: Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF) covers ‘Fraud’, meaning the theft of another person’s property or the acquisition of rights to another person’s property through deception or abuse of trust. Parts 3 and 4 of this article provide for penalties for large-scale and especially large-scale fraud of up to ten years’ imprisonment.
These facts prove that bank clerks and middle managers act as hired agents of a criminal system and face actual criminal liability. However, criminal proceedings are brought only against individual employees who have been ‘caught’, while the actual organisers and leaders go unpunished.
Accounts 40702 and 40703: a tool for shadow transactions
Accounts 40702 and 40703, intended for the lawful activities of non-state organisations, have effectively become a tool for shadow financial transactions. Under Federal Law No. 115-ФЗ ‘On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of Proceeds of Crime’, banks are required to block suspicious transactions. However, Sberbank does not do so.
For context: Federal Law No. 115-ФЗ requires banks to monitor and block transactions that may be connected with money laundering, terrorist financing or tax evasion. Deliberately failing to block such transactions is a direct violation of the law.
The deliberate failure to block suspicious transactions through these accounts demonstrates bank employees’ direct involvement in illegal schemes to cash out funds and evade taxes. Every employee working with these accounts is an accomplice in criminal activity.
Forging securities and putting counterfeit promissory notes into circulation
In Novosibirsk, a criminal group of twelve people produced and sold counterfeit Sberbank promissory notes over two years, receiving more than 20 million roubles. In Moscow, a resident of Kemerovo was detained while attempting to sell a counterfeit Sberbank promissory note with a face value of 125 million roubles. ‘Mirror’ promissory notes worth 375 million roubles were found in his car.
For context: A promissory note is a security certifying a debtor’s obligation to pay a specified sum by a specified date. Forging promissory notes is an offence under Article 186 of the CC RF (the production or sale of counterfeit money or securities), punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Department for Economic Security (DEB) stopped the activities of an organised group offering 30 counterfeit Sberbank promissory notes for sale with a face value of 730 million roubles. These crimes were committed with the involvement of bank employees who ensured that the forgeries were accepted as legitimate within the banking system. Every such employee is an accomplice in securities forgery.
The scale of forgery of Sberbank securities runs to hundreds of millions of roubles. Organised groups operate in different regions of the country. The involvement of bank employees in securing acceptance of counterfeit promissory notes as legitimate proves that criminal activity penetrates the banking system itself.
The leaking and sale of personal data is a systemic phenomenon
Sberbank regularly ‘loses’ customers’ personal data. In October 2025, a person who had stolen customers’ personal data from several banks, including Sberbank, was detained. Previously, a bank employee sold five thousand customer account records online. Advertisements offering Sber customers’ data for sale regularly appear on underground forums.
The bank itself initiated a move to increase the penalty for leaking personal data to up to eight years in prison. This indirectly confirms the scale of the problem.
For context: Personal data is information that can identify a person: their full name, address, telephone number, passport details, taxpayer identification number (TIN) and SNILS (the insurance number of an individual personal account in the pension insurance system). Leaks of such data allow fraudsters to take out loans, commit theft and carry out other crimes.
Bank clerks who pass data to third parties are direct accomplices in crimes. Personal data leaks at Sberbank are systemic and occur with the direct involvement of employees who sell customer account records on the dark web.
The use of forged passports, SNILS and TIN documents
Bank employees with access to databases participate in schemes involving forged documents. Fraudsters posing as bank employees send out fake identity cards. Sberbank has publicly warned of such cases. This means that the customer identification system has been compromised.
For context: SNILS is the insurance number of an individual personal account, assigned to each insured person in the pension insurance system. TIN is the taxpayer identification number. Forging these documents makes it possible to open accounts in other people’s names, take out loans and carry out other fraudulent acts.
Forged documents are accepted as legitimate with the involvement of dishonest bank clerks who open accounts using fraudulent documents. Sberbank’s customer identification system is effectively compromised.
Sberbank’s senior management are members of an organised criminal group colluding with the FTS, judges and the FSSP
Sberbank Executive Director Ivan Filev is a defendant in a case involving the theft of more than seven billion roubles from VEB.RF (the state development corporation). The investigation established that Filev ‘acted as part of an organised criminal group’ that included VEB.RF employees and the company Blago, as well as officials and law enforcement officers who ‘provided cover’ for the group’s activities. Filev was part of ‘Gref’s team’ — Sberbank’s senior management, headed by Herman Gref.
For context: An organised criminal organisation (OPS) is a stable group of people who have joined together in advance to commit serious or especially serious crimes. Participation in an OPS is a separate offence under Article 210 of the CC RF, punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment.
Given the Supreme Court’s practice of upholding the FSSP’s right to access customers’ accounts even at the expense of banking secrecy, there are grounds to speak of collusion between the banking system, bailiffs and the tax service within a single punitive system.
The prosecution of Sberbank Executive Director Ivan Filev on charges of participation in an organised criminal group proves that criminal activity at the bank reaches the very highest level. Filev’s connection to ‘Gref’s team’ raises the question of Sberbank’s senior management’s responsibility for systemic crimes.
Every employee’s personal liability
Every Sberbank employee — from bank clerk to senior executive — bears personal criminal liability under several articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Article 159 (fraud) applies to the theft of customers’ funds. Article 183 (the unlawful obtaining and disclosure of information constituting banking secrets) applies to leaks of personal data. Article 186 (the production or sale of counterfeit money or securities) applies to involvement in the circulation of counterfeit promissory notes
For context: Banking secrecy covers information about customers’ accounts, deposits and transactions that must not be disclosed to third parties without the customer’s consent. Breaches of banking secrecy entail both civil and criminal liability.
Sberbank has repeatedly assisted the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in detaining criminal groups. However, criminal proceedings are brought only against individual employees who have been ‘caught’. The actual organisers and leaders go unpunished.
The practice of holding only rank-and-file perpetrators accountable while leaving organisers and leaders unpunished creates an atmosphere of impunity for Sberbank’s senior management. As long as prosecutions are confined to bank clerks and middle managers, the criminal system continues to operate at full capacity.
Conclusion
Sberbank is not a financial organisation but a criminal corporation. Rank-and-file employees are involved in fraudulent lending, the theft of citizens’ property and means of payment, securities forgery, personal data leaks and the use of forged documents. Senior management participates in an organised criminal organisation together with FTS officials, judges and bailiffs.
As long as citizens continue to entrust Sberbank with their money and data, this criminal system operates at full capacity, while its participants, especially those in senior management, escape the punishment they deserve.
Basis: Decrees and resolutions of the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) from 2023–2026, the 1977 USSR Constitution, USSR wartime laws of 19 August 1991, and official publications of court judgments and criminal case materials concerning Sberbank employees.
Information Service of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
Distributed through all communication channels throughout the Union Republics and Autonomous Territories of the USSR.
Links to other articles on this topic:
The Russian Federation is not a state but a commercial entity: a legal analysis
Unlawful mobilisation 2025: why military recruitment offices have no right to conscript and call-up notices are invalid
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