German claims: we examine historical treaties, gold and settlements, testing the grounds of the 2023 demands and identifying who faces the claims. A financial demand and an established present-day debt are different questions.
Contents
German claims in 2023: tracing the treaty obligations
The analysis begins with the events of 1 December 2023, when, according to the article, Germany closed its consulates in the Russian Federation and formally reaffirmed earlier claims against the Russian Federation’s trading corporation. That corporation is described as the continuation of the Russian Empire. Germany thereby identified the addressee of its claims: not the Soviet Union, but the corporation that had assumed the relevant succession. In this interpretation, closing consulates is more than a diplomatic gesture. It is a legally significant action confirming that Germany connects further settlement of historical obligations to that entity.
As part of these claims, Germany is said to have demanded an inventory, audit and rectification of all rights and obligations, property, assets, balances, records and accounts relating to the Russo–German commercial treaty. These obligations are historically associated with a treaty relationship formally ended by Nicholas II’s manifesto in 1904, although its disputes remained unresolved even under Stalin. In 2023, these questions were raised again and presented to the Kremlin as a formal demand. Inventory and audit require full reconciliation of assets and liabilities accumulated over decades of the treaty framework; rectification means bringing them into conformity with established obligations.
We emphasise that the claims were made when the Russian Federation trading corporation had already been closed. We attach particular legal significance to this circumstance: obligations arising from the treaty relationship cannot be assigned to the Soviet Union, which was not party to the relevant agreements in the capacity of a trading company. Instead, the Russian Federation, through the corporation described, claims to continue the Russian Empire and must therefore bear the burden of settling historical obligations. Closing the corporation does not terminate those obligations; it brings the liquidation balance into focus.
Alongside its demands for inventory and rectification, Germany is described as presenting a countervailing liquidation balance in 2023. This covers rights and obligations accumulated under the Russo–German commercial treaty and its associated financial and economic protocols. Its presentation continues a treaty relationship originating in the late nineteenth century and extended by the Supplementary Treaty of 27 August 1918 to Brest-Litovsk. The countervailing liquidation balance records the final position of reciprocal claims and serves as an instrument for definitive settlement between the parties.
We therefore regard the German claims of 1 December 2023 as a direct continuation of the treaty relationship linking Russo–German trade in 1894–1904, the supplementary treaty of 1918 and subsequent settlements. The countervailing liquidation balance presented in 2023 concludes this extended history and assigns obligations specifically to the Russian Federation trading corporation, rather than to the Soviet Union. For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this provides grounds for further analysis of each component of the treaty framework, including succession and financial and economic sovereignty. USSR stands for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The treaties of 1894–1904 and Nicholas II’s manifesto
Russo–German commercial treaties concluded between 1894 and 1904 form the initial link in the treaty relationship subsequently extended by the Brest-Litovsk Supplementary Treaty of 27 August 1918 and reflected, in this account, in Germany’s claims of 1 December 2023. They established the legal and economic foundations of trade between the Russian Empire and the German Reich. Their operation was ended by Nicholas II’s manifesto in 1904. Ending the treaties by manifesto did not, however, finally resolve all associated disputes and obligations.
Nicholas II’s 1904 manifesto legally formalised termination of the commercial treaties, but subsequent events, as described in our analysis, show that reciprocal settlements and claims arising from them remained unresolved. Even during the Stalin period, when the Soviet state undertook extensive efforts to regulate external obligations and protect its interests, disputes under the Russo–German commercial treaties were not settled. This is central to our explanation of why Germany returned to the issue in 2023 with demands to inventory, audit and rectify rights and obligations under the commercial treaty.
The 1894–1904 time frame and termination by the 1904 manifesto therefore did not close the treaty relationship, in this argument, but merely suspended its operation. The persistence of disputes under Stalin confirms that treaty obligations remained relevant to later settlements. This is why Germany considered it possible in 2023 to revisit those treaties and require the Russian Federation trading corporation, as the declared continuation of the Russian Empire, to review all relevant rights and obligations, including assets, balances and accounts.
For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this historical discussion matters as a link in understanding the continuity of obligations. The 1894–1904 treaties and 1904 manifesto demonstrate, in its account, that legal foundations established around the turn of the twentieth century did not vanish. They were transferred into a different framework through the ‘German Reich’ trust, the 1918 supplementary treaty and subsequent international agreements. Germany’s claims of 1 December 2023 should consequently be viewed as continuing the same treaty relationship rather than as something wholly new.
In practical terms, analysing present-day German claims requires consideration of the entire chain of treaty relations beginning in 1894–1904. Termination through the 1904 manifesto did not automatically annul every obligation arising from the treaties, especially where obligations had been incorporated into a trust structure or confirmed in later agreements. Unresolved disputes during the Stalin period underline that the question remained open and could be raised again if appropriate legal grounds existed—grounds Germany sought to invoke in 2023, according to the source.
The treaties of 1894–1904 also established legal, as well as economic, parameters for later settlements. They developed principles of mutual responsibility that were subsequently incorporated into the ‘German Reich’ trust. Nicholas II is identified as its settlor and beneficiary, with the Soviet Union later recognised as exclusive beneficiary. The obligations arising from the commercial treaties therefore did not disappear with the 1904 manifesto but passed into another legal form while retaining force for subsequent periods.
The unresolved disputes of the Stalin period have another aspect. The Soviet state actively defended its international interests, yet questions rooted in the 1894–1904 treaties received no final settlement. We attribute this to the complexity of the trust structure and Germany’s reluctance to close reciprocal claims definitively. By 2023, Germany consequently considered it possible to present a countervailing liquidation balance addressed to the Russian Federation trading corporation rather than to the Soviet Union.
We emphasise that the 1894–1904 treaty relationship is more than historical material. In our analysis, it directly affects understanding of contemporary legal processes and assessment of claims made against the Russian Federation as the declared continuation of the Russian Empire. Studying the treaties provides a coherent account of continuity of obligations and avoids the mistaken conclusion that the 1904 manifesto settled every question. Instead, the manifesto marked a transition of obligations into a new form, which we see confirmed by later events, including the German claims of 1 December 2023.
The Supplementary Treaty of 27 August 1918: scope and legal effect
The supplementary treaty to Brest-Litovsk, described as signed on 27 August 1918 between Soviet Russia on one side and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the other, became a key financial and economic link in the Russo–German treaty relationship. Its financial and economic protocols certified and confirmed Germany’s renunciation of territorial claims. The German Reich thereby legally committed itself, in this account, not to make territorial demands on the Russian Republic.
The supplementary treaty simultaneously established German alliance obligations: in the event of Entente intervention in the Russian Republic, Germany undertook to become a military ally of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR). Germany also recognised Russian–Soviet rights and acquisitions from the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus and Black Sea waters. This recognition was accompanied by agreement to end Germany’s occupation status in Ukraine and transfer the territory to RSFSR troops, according to the article.
The Soviet Republic undertook to supply goods to Germany under the Russo–German commercial treaty. Germany undertook to purchase 25 per cent of the RSFSR’s Baku oil output and to pay and offset Russia’s negative prewar trade balance with Germany. In addition, under the law governing the place of performance and existence of the ‘German Reich’ trust, Germany was to receive a gold payment equal to one-twelfth of one per cent of Nicholas II’s rights as settlor and beneficiary. This share was valued at 245 tonnes of Russian gold payable to Germany.
The supplementary treaty thus linked territorial guarantees, military-alliance obligations, goods deliveries, oil settlements and gold payments. The article presents it as the document that effectively placed the young Soviet Republic, and later the Soviet Union, in the position of debtor for payments continuing up to 1991. It also states that settlements continued from 1991, since ‘we are one of the parts of this system’.
For the Russian Federation trading company, however, the supplementary treaty is treated as excluded because it ceased to operate and lost force in November 1918. The corporation, described as closed at the time of the account, must therefore pay trustee remuneration and all sums due to Germany from the German Reich, which the account dates from 1870. Under the Treaty of Rapallo between the RSFSR and Germany, its supplements and recourse or debit attribution to the Soviet Union as external debt, these external debts and obligations are said not to pass, or be eligible to pass, to the Soviet Union. They fall only on the Russian Federation trading company, or ‘Russia—the Land of Opportunity’.
The countervailing liquidation balance presented in 2023 by ‘Comrade Merkel’, as the source puts it, was determined on this legal basis. Although excluded from operation for the Russian Federation trading company, the 1918 supplementary treaty is still described as a source of obligations that must be settled by that corporation rather than by the Soviet Union. The treaty relationship of 1894–1918 thus connects with the German claims of 1 December 2023 addressed to the corporation.
The ‘German Reich’ trust: settlor, beneficiary and transfer of rights to the USSR
The ‘German Reich’ trust is central to our account of the subsequent fate of Russo–German commercial obligations. Nicholas II is identified as its settlor and beneficiary. His rights and titles under the trust are treated as the primary foundation of property and financial claims later redirected to the Soviet state. The trust is dated from 1870 and described as covering both the Russian Empire and subsequent stages of Russian–German relations. In this construction, rights to trust income and annuities were initially concentrated in the settlor-beneficiary’s hands, while a trustee administered them under the trust terms and international treaties.
The key legal event was final recognition that Nicholas II’s rights and titles had lawfully passed to the Soviet state upon formation of the USSR on 30 December 1922. From that moment, the Soviet Union was recognised, in the source’s wording, as an object of rights and a sovereign in trust relations. The transfer was more than a formality: all trust income and annuities became concentrated on the Soviet side, and the empire’s former rights ceased to exist independently. This recognition secured an exclusive position for the Soviet Union within the trust and established the legal basis for subsequent settlements.
Through the Versailles treaty system and the terms of Brest-Litovsk, the ‘German Reich’ trustee recognised the Soviet Union as exclusive beneficiary, according to the article. The trustee accepted that status and received remuneration from the Soviet state for duly administering the entire Russian Empire during Nicholas II’s reign and subsequently transferring power to the people. Payment amounted to 94 tonnes of gold of 999 fineness. The remuneration thus represented both recognition of completed administration and confirmation of the transfer of rights to the Soviet side.
The remaining trust obligations, amounting to 155 tonnes of gold, were to be transferred by the Soviet Union to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) upon termination. The issue was discussed in Tehran in 1943 while war continued; final payments were made between 1945 and 1949. The trust relationship therefore continued through recognition of the Soviet Union as exclusive beneficiary, determination of trustee remuneration and subsequent settlements with the GDR. We regard these payments as confirming continued performance after the USSR’s formation and its responsibility for completing the trust accounts.
Recognition of the Soviet Union as exclusive beneficiary has a direct consequence for current claims in this reasoning. If all ‘German Reich’ trust rights passed to the Soviet state on 30 December 1922, later claims addressed to the Russian Federation trading corporation cannot automatically be transferred to the Soviet Union. The structure distinguishes settlor-beneficiary, trustee and beneficiary, with the Soviet side recognised as exclusive beneficiary. This provides the asserted legal basis for the 2023 countervailing liquidation balance assigning obligations to the trading company. Distinguishing rights and duties within the trust separates Soviet state obligations from those of other entities operating on former imperial territory.
Understanding the trust requires recognising that, from 1870, it accumulated property and financial elements associated with Russian imperial–German relations, according to the source. Nicholas II held rights to income and annuities that passed to the Soviet Union after 30 December 1922. Recognition of the USSR as exclusive beneficiary meant no other person, including the Russian Federation trading corporation, could claim those rights without direct Soviet consent. The German demands of 1 December 2023 must therefore be considered against the asserted prior recognition of Soviet trust rights. The countervailing liquidation balance records a division of obligations and confirms, in our account, that the Soviet Union is not the debtor for claims addressed to the trading company.
The ‘German Reich’ trust is thus presented as a structure in which the settlor-beneficiary, Nicholas II, and the later beneficiary, the Soviet Union, occupy different historical periods. The transfer of rights and titles on 30 December 1922 definitively established the Soviet state’s exclusive position. Trustee remuneration of 94 tonnes of gold of 999 fineness and subsequent payments of 155 tonnes to the GDR in 1945–1949 are cited as confirmation that the trust relationship was concluded in favour of the Soviet side. These circumstances underpin our conclusion that the trust’s obligations cannot be redirected to the Soviet Union.
The Treaty of Rapallo and the transfer of external debts
The Treaty of Rapallo between the RSFSR and Germany and its supplements are presented as the legal milestone that definitively allocated obligations under the ‘German Reich’ trust. Under these documents, the article argues, external debts and obligations accumulated through Russo–German trade neither pass nor are transferable to the Soviet Union. They are assigned exclusively to the Russian Federation trading company, which declared itself the continuation of the Russian Empire. This distinction separates obligations historically associated with the trust from rights and titles that passed to the Soviet state.
This distinction has direct practical significance in the argument. The Soviet Union, as a victorious state in the Second World War and a power that assumed the burden of postwar settlement, cannot be regarded as the debtor for obligations arising from the 1894–1904 treaties and the 1918 supplementary treaty. Those obligations are historically and legally attached to another construction: a trust whose settlor-beneficiary was Nicholas II, rather than the Soviet state. We interpret Rapallo as placing the burden of trust settlements on the trading company rather than the Soviet Union.
On that basis, a countervailing liquidation balance was presented in 2023. Germany’s claims of 1 December 2023, including inventory, audit and rectification of rights and obligations under the Russo–German commercial treaty, are described as addressed to the Russian Federation trading corporation. In this scheme, external debts do not pass to the Soviet Union: it retains its position as exclusive trust beneficiary without becoming the debtor for trust obligations. We see this distinction reflected in the German demands of 2023.
Two levels must be distinguished. The first consists of debts and obligations entered against the Russian Federation trading company under Rapallo and its supplements. The second consists of rights and titles that definitively passed to the Soviet state after the USSR’s formation on 30 December 1922. Conflating these levels leads, in our reasoning, to the erroneous conclusion that the Soviet Union answers for debts Rapallo did not expressly assign to it. Such conflation is rejected on both legal and practical grounds.
Rapallo therefore serves as a dividing line in this account, separating the Russian Federation trading company’s obligations from the Soviet Union’s rights and titles. The 2023 countervailing liquidation balance confirms this distinction and shows that German claims were addressed to the trading company rather than the USSR. The distinction is said to remain effective today, providing legal certainty as to the proper debtor for ‘German Reich’ trust obligations.
The 2023 countervailing liquidation balance: who bears the obligations?
The countervailing liquidation balance reportedly presented by Germany on 1 December 2023 clearly identifies the addressees of its claims. They concern the Russian Federation trading corporation, which declared itself the continuation of the Russian Empire, rather than the Soviet Union. That entity must inventory, audit and rectify property rights and obligations, assets, balances, records and accounts under the Russo–German commercial treaty. We derive this allocation from the ‘German Reich’ trust structure and the distinction in Rapallo and its supplements: external debts and obligations do not pass to the Soviet Union but attach only to the trading company.
This allocation has a practical consequence. The Soviet Union, as exclusive beneficiary, obtained recognition of its rights and titles; the trustee received remuneration of 94 tonnes of gold of 999 fineness, and the remaining 155 tonnes were payable to the GDR, with payments made in 1945–1949. Soviet trust settlements were thereby completed in this account. Everything outside that performance remains an obligation of the Russian Federation trading company, including trustee remuneration and sums due to Germany under the supplementary treaty of 27 August 1918, treated as excluded for that company because it ceased to operate in November 1918.
The 2023 countervailing liquidation balance closes the treaty relationship begun by the commercial treaties of 1894–1904. Despite termination by Nicholas II’s 1904 manifesto, their substantive disputes remained unresolved even under Stalin and were presented to the Kremlin in 2023 as a continuing basis for claims. The argument is that, if the Russian Federation declared itself the continuation of the Russian Empire, it also assumed the corresponding property claims and duty to rectify treaty rights and obligations. The Soviet Union retains its standing as victorious power and exclusive trust beneficiary without becoming the debtor for external obligations.
For the USSR Civil Defence Academy’s editors, this conclusion is more than a legal proposition. It illustrates how treaty continuity and trust structures allocate responsibility between a state and a trading corporation, and why Germany addressed the Russian Federation in 2023. Closing German consulates is interpreted as confirmation of claims against that corporation. The countervailing liquidation balance is consequently an independent demand on the entity that assumed the title of continuation of the Russian Empire, rather than a continuation of Soviet obligations, and must be performed in that capacity.
The article emphasises that the 2023 demands were public and supported by diplomatic measures: consular closures visibly demonstrated the seriousness of Germany’s intentions. In our interpretation, this gives the countervailing liquidation balance the character of an official interstate demand rather than a private claim, even though it is addressed to a particular economic entity—the Russian Federation trading corporation. We present this as an example of legal structures from the past continuing to shape contemporary international relations and requiring a thorough understanding of history and legal technique.
We conclude that the 2023 countervailing liquidation balance is an independent claim against the Russian Federation as the declared continuation of the Russian Empire, rather than a continuation of Soviet obligations. Having performed its obligations under the ‘German Reich’ trust, the Soviet Union retained its standing as victorious power and exclusive beneficiary without assuming external debts. This conclusion is central to our understanding of Germany’s present status and claims, and to training civil defence specialists who need to navigate complex questions of international law.
Document for comparison: Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 1990—United Nations (UN) Treaty Collection. This provides documentary context for the German settlement. The registration does not substantiate the financial claims attributed to 2023 in this article.
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