Soviet Ukraine, the UNR and Crimea: we examine territory, state rights and the Soviet inheritance, tracing the links between borders and succession.
Contents
Soviet Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Republic: different claims to succession
The dispute over Ukraine’s inheritance begins with a distinction involving territory, state property and citizens’ lives. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) and the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) have different foundations of existence. In our interpretation, the Ukrainian SSR remains within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and retains its own rights. Invoking the UNR’s legacy does not automatically entitle another structure to everything held by the Soviet republic. This distinction defines the Soviet claim as presented here: identify the actual holder of the rights and explain how a claimant obtained authority to dispose of that holder’s common wealth.
Our argument links the present-day structure called ‘Ukraine’ to the UNR and treats it as a corporate entity operating on Ukrainian SSR territory. We maintain that the Soviet republic continues to exist. Succession therefore cannot, in our argument, be settled by sharing a geographical name or locating governing bodies on the same territory. The republic itself, its property and those administering it must be distinguished. Otherwise, management of resources quietly becomes a claim to sovereignty that the administrator did not originally possess.
The word ‘title’ is important to this account. It denotes the basis associated with rights over territory, property or representation. It translates complex discussion of status into straightforward questions: who claims to hold a right, from whom was it received, and to what does it apply? The UNR’s title, the Ukrainian SSR’s rights and the USSR’s Union-wide rights do not merge simply because all are discussed in relation to Ukraine.
Ukraine declared independence in 1991 within the Ukrainian SSR’s administrative borders. This is a significant part of the argument. The territory derived from the Soviet state structure, while the claim to historical continuity referred to the UNR. We identify a gap between the origin of the claimed powers and the extent of the common wealth to which they were applied. Declaring independence within Ukrainian SSR borders did not, in our view, itself transfer those borders and their associated inheritance to the UNR.
The 1992 transfer of regalia and authority from the UNR’s state centre in exile to Ukraine’s leadership continues the same theme. The recipient could claim a connection with UNR history, but the Soviet republic had not transferred its rights through that centre. Documents belonging to one line of statehood therefore do not become documents of succession to another. This distinction is particularly visible when examining territories, the historical grounds for their inclusion and the limits of a claimant’s authority.
Territory, regalia and sovereign rights
Territorial questions make the dispute concrete. Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina, Southern Bessarabia, Transcarpathia and Crimea are considered separately from the UNR’s legacy. Their status is connected with later Soviet arrangements and distinct historical foundations. The years 1939, 1940, 1945 and 1954 illustrate the different periods brought together within one republic’s borders. We argue that a claim to this entire body of rights cannot rest solely on invoking the early twentieth-century UNR.
A Union republic’s withdrawal also required a defined procedure. The legal reasoning centres on the USSR Law of 3 April 1990 concerning the procedure for resolving questions associated with a Union republic’s secession. Its significance lies in addressing a republic’s future through Union legislation and the population’s expressed will. A political declaration of independence does not replace the entire procedure. We therefore base our assertion of the Ukrainian SSR’s continued existence on our conclusion that withdrawal under Soviet law remained incomplete.
Precision in questions put to citizens is especially important. The referendum of 17 March 1991 on preserving the USSR concerned the Union’s future. In the Ukrainian context, the article separately compares ‘Ukraine’, ‘Ukrainian SSR’ and the wording ‘Union of Soviet Sovereign States’. Superficially similar expressions can designate different state arrangements. This produces a fundamental argument: people’s expressed will cannot be transferred from one voting proposition to another without explaining which state and form of statehood they are being asked to support.
In this account, the Belovezha Accords of 8 December 1991 likewise did not terminate the USSR. The Soviet side questions the signatories’ authority and the absence of the necessary Union approval. Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) does not resolve who was entitled to decide the Union’s fate. The argument thus connects incomplete withdrawal by an individual republic with the continuity of the Union state of which we consider it still a part.
Transcarpathia introduces another foundation: the Rusyn title. Through it, the article connects the population’s history, land rights and relations with Czechia and Slovakia. The point is that the region is not treated as territory without historical memory of its own. A succession claim must take account of the people whose rights and will form part of that history. Discussion of borders therefore becomes a question about those living on the land and connecting their heritage of statehood with it.
Crimea and the dispute over representation
The Crimean argument distinguishes rights over the peninsula from its administrative use. It takes the Soviet–Turkish treaties and agreements of 1921 as its starting point, then connects Transnistria, the Rusyn title and the transfer of Crimea for administrative use by the RSFSR, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian SSR. This complex sequence serves one proposition: administering territory and holding all associated rights are different matters. A single administrative decision cannot explain the full history of the title being asserted.
Restoration of republican representation is also considered through its connection with the Union. Soviet emergency bodies, including the State Committee on the State of Emergency (SCSE) of the USSR, are assigned a role in preserving and exercising Soviet powers. For circumstances in which a republican government cannot operate on its own territory, the article discusses a reserve legal institution in Prague or Bratislava. This is a proposed way to preserve representation, not a report that a government has already relocated.
A diplomatic mission faces the same question: whom exactly does it represent? The concept of a ‘consular shield’ used here concerns confirmation of state status and protection of representation. Within our framework, a Ukrainian SSR mission within the USSR and a corporate entity’s representation have different foundations. A diplomatic designation should therefore identify where authority belongs, connecting external representation to a particular republic, its rights and its duties towards citizens.
Behind these questions remains the human dimension. Citizenship and state affiliation involve individual will, which changes of name do not make irrelevant. For Transcarpathia, we specifically raise the absence of voluntary consent by Soviet citizens to assignment to a different line of statehood. This argument shifts attention from names and regalia to people. Their interests must be considered in decisions about the republic, its territory and its future state structure.
The Soviet position presented here becomes clearer when each participant is identified precisely. We maintain that the Ukrainian SSR retains rights within the USSR, while the UNR has a distinct history that does not itself transfer Soviet common wealth to it. Territories have differing foundations of status, and citizens have their own will and interests. Restoring these connections gives our idea of Soviet renewal concrete substance: precision in state names, the foundations of representation and responsibility for shared land.
Document for comparison: The Helsinki Final Act: principles governing relations between states. A document for comparing questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity with our arguments about inheritance.
More on history and law: USSR Civil Defence Academy.






































