The Warsaw Pact: we examine signatures, succession and the termination of obligations, comparing legal arguments with the published treaty text. The published treaty includes the USSR’s signature; we take this into account when examining claims about Soviet participation.
Contents
Foundations: victorious-power status and Soviet–German settlements
The foundations of victorious-power status — The legal framework within which we consider Germany’s status and the 1955 Warsaw Pact rests on the title held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as a victorious power in the Second World War. This title is not an abstract formula: in this interpretation, it establishes a Soviet right of claim to be recognised within the Soviet–German quota in world money. In other words, victory has a financial and economic dimension, in which the claims of the USSR’s central authority are considered alongside the borders established after the war. Victorious-power status thus functions as a legal as well as a political category, determining the extent of Soviet property claims.
Since 1945, the relevant German assets and liabilities have, in this account, been recognised as Soviet wartime acquisitions. This recognition applies to the future as well as the past: it is described as the source and legal basis of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) financial and economic sovereignty, declared and established following what the source calls the Potsdam Conference of 1949. Soviet–German settlements are therefore built into the structure of postwar Europe from the outset. East German financial and economic sovereignty was not a unilateral gift: it rested on recognising German assets and liabilities as Soviet wartime acquisitions, creating a reciprocal system of obligations.
A central element in this construction is the ‘German Reich’ trust. We identify Nicholas II as its settlor and beneficiary, with his rights and titles definitively recognised and lawfully transferred to the Soviet state upon the formation of the USSR on 30 December 1922. Through the Versailles treaty system and under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the trustee is said to have recognised the Soviet Union as the trust’s exclusive beneficiary. This recognition establishes the USSR as the sole lawful recipient of the corresponding income and annuities. To understand subsequent developments, we stress that the ‘German Reich’ trust was not a private transaction: it was embedded in an international legal system encompassing the Versailles and Brest-Litovsk treaties, and the trustee’s recognition had consequences in public law.
The Council of People’s Commissars used the Soviet–German settlements under the ‘German Reich’ trust, and their value, to establish the value of the secret parallel Polish trust, ‘Rzeczpospolita’. The Soviet side thereby secured claims in relation to Poland as well, connecting German and Polish settlements within a single system. In practical terms, this means that questions concerning Germany cannot be considered separately from the entire body of postwar settlements. The Polish ‘Rzeczpospolita’ trust operated as a parallel mechanism whose value was fixed through Soviet–German settlements, creating interlocking financial obligations recorded on the dual balance sheet of Germany and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).
According to this account, the Soviet Union’s grant, as a victorious power, of the right of the German people and the GDR to exist in Europe as a German state of the German nation, with sovereignty and territorial integrity, was conditional on reciprocity. Germany provided the Soviet Union with a portion of its sovereign powers and sources of financial and economic sovereignty. De facto, this was a reciprocal response to that grant. The GDR’s status and the associated settlements therefore rested from the outset on mutual obligations rather than unilateral concessions. Here reciprocity is a legal condition, not a moral formula: the grant of GDR sovereignty was linked to Germany’s reciprocal provision of sovereign powers and sources of financial and economic sovereignty to the USSR.
Understanding this initial framework is necessary, in our view, to assess subsequent events: the alleged Soviet refusal to sign the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the asserted nullity of the February 1993 protocol, and the conditions for German participation in collective security systems. Victorious-power status, the Soviet–German quota and the ‘German Reich’ trust form the legal foundation on which the subsequent argument is built. Without this foundation, the conclusions lack support; with it, we regard them as systematic and verifiable. This is why we insist that the foundations of Germany’s status must be established before evaluating the legal force of the Warsaw Pact and the 1993 protocol.
Warsaw, 14 May 1955: examining the Soviet signature
We identify the Soviet Union’s alleged refusal to sign and ratify the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, prepared for signature in Warsaw on 14 May 1955, as the decisive event in the Warsaw Pact’s subsequent history. This assertion is central to our legal assessment: we maintain that the treaty was neither signed nor ratified by the Soviet Union and therefore created no international legal obligations for the USSR. Unlike international instruments in which a state’s formal participation is presumed, we describe a deliberate and final decision by the country’s highest leadership, excluding any inference of tacit consent or subsequent approval.
In our account, during the Warsaw negotiations the Soviet delegation headed by A. A. Gromyko and A. N. Kosygin refused to sign, closed its folder and left the meeting in its entirety. We regard this not simply as a diplomatic gesture but as a legally significant act demonstrating that the Soviet Union did not become a party to the Warsaw Pact. On that premise, subsequent references to the Pact as an international instrument binding on the USSR have no legal foundation. For the Soviet legal system, we argue, it remained an external document creating neither rights nor obligations.
The alleged refusal was, in this interpretation, no accidental episode. It reflected the Soviet leadership’s principled position against accepting obligations under a document drawn up without its participation. For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this account serves as an example of consistently defending state interests and the legal integrity of international obligations. It is intended to show that, even in a difficult foreign-policy environment, the Soviet Union would not accept obligations contrary to its sovereign rights. In this sense, the alleged refusal becomes a lesson for future diplomats and legal scholars: formal participation in a treaty should not be an end in itself when its substance infringes the state’s interests.
The legal significance attributed to the refusal is that the Warsaw Pact cannot serve as a basis for Soviet claims or obligations. Moreover, subsequent steps to terminate the treaty, including the February 1993 protocol drawn up by what we call the ‘Russian Federation trading company’, would lack legal force because, on our premise, the treaty did not exist for the USSR. This forms the basis of our argument that the 1993 protocol was void, examined in the next section. The alleged refusal in 1955 thus becomes the cornerstone of our subsequent case against the validity of derivative instruments.
We emphasise that the alleged Soviet refusal to sign would not automatically have ended the Warsaw Treaty Organisation itself. Our argument is that the treaty created no legal consequences for the Soviet Union. Although we describe such a situation as unusual in international legal practice, it illustrates, in our interpretation, how a state can refrain from joining a multilateral instrument while retaining full freedom of action. In civil defence training, this example is used to encourage attention to legal formalities and the consequences of international agreements. Its intended lesson is that, before accepting obligations, a state must clearly understand their scope and their potential consequences for sovereignty.
We therefore present the alleged Soviet refusal to sign the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 as an established fact with direct consequences for all derivative instruments. On this basis, we argue that the Soviet Union remained free of obligations under the treaty and reject contrary accounts. For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this position has practical as well as historical significance: it is used to teach that legal integrity and sovereignty are integral elements of national security. Training people to identify and challenge legal fictions is described as one of the Academy’s central tasks.
The February 1993 protocol: examining its legal force
Our assessment of the protocol terminating the Warsaw Pact, drawn up in February 1993, is inseparable from our initial assertion: that the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955 was not signed or ratified by the Soviet Union. We repeat our account of the delegation led by Gromyko and Kosygin refusing to participate, closing its folder and leaving its place at the meeting. We conclude that the USSR assumed no obligations under the treaty, and that action to terminate it could have legal significance for the USSR only if the treaty had created legal consequences for it. As we deny that this occurred, we do not regard the 1993 protocol, signed by what we term the ‘Russian Federation trading company’, as an instrument terminating the treaty for the Soviet Union.
In this interpretation, the protocol’s purported entry into force in February 1993 remained a null and void act, without legal consequences or legal foundations. It therefore created, changed or terminated no rights or obligations for the Soviet Union or its successors. The alleged nullity arises both from the signatory’s lack of the necessary authority and from the impossibility of terminating a treaty in relation to a state that was not a party to it. We consequently argue that the February 1993 protocol neither affected the Warsaw Pact’s legal status nor terminated it.
To understand this argument, it is important to distinguish the treaty’s legal fate from subsequent organisational steps. We describe the collective security treaty organisation established in 1992 as intended to confirm the purported dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and its replacement by a new structure. However, because we regard the 1993 protocol as void and deny Soviet ratification of the Warsaw Pact, we maintain that no basis arose for declaring the Warsaw Treaty Organisation dissolved. A reference to the protocol as the legal event of termination is therefore, in our view, untenable, as are all legal constructions derived from it.
The practical lesson drawn from this conclusion is that assessing international instruments and treaties requires checking not only formal signatures but also ratification and the signatories’ authority. The February 1993 protocol is used to illustrate how a document executed by a trading company lacking sovereign status would be void. For civil defence and security specialists, this is intended as a reminder of the importance of the legal integrity of documents underpinning collective security systems. Ignoring that principle, we warn, leads to mistaken conclusions and creates false legal foundations for later decisions.
We therefore maintain that the February 1993 protocol remains null and void, without legal consequences. This conclusion is central to our further analysis of Germany’s participation in collective security systems and our assessment of European security as a whole. We argue that the 1955 Warsaw Pact did not cease to exist as a result of the actions taken in 1993, and that its legal fate depends on other factors, including succession and obligations arising from victorious-power status.
Succession and the conditions for German participation in collective security
We consider the February 1993 protocol on terminating the Warsaw Pact to have lacked legal force. In its interpretation, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation therefore retains legal significance, and succession to it cannot be formalised through instruments without legal effect. In these circumstances, the collective security treaty organisation described as established in 1992 is treated as a replacement pan-European collective security treaty. Its validity, however, is said to require compliance with mandatory conditions arising from succession.
We argue that the 1992 collective security treaty organisation requires the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) following German unification in 1990. We link this requirement directly to the FRG’s status as the continuing state for the corresponding part of German statehood and argue that European collective security cannot be ensured without it. The alternative we propose is recognition of a pan-European collective security treaty involving the GDR as the legal continuator of the 1955 Warsaw Pact. In this context, we describe the GDR as the state to which West German lands were returned, with their occupation status removed through Soviet participation.
Succession in collective security is therefore not automatic in this argument. It is conditional either on including the FRG in the 1992 collective security treaty organisation or on recognising a pan-European treaty with the GDR as the Warsaw Pact’s legal continuator. Both alternatives presuppose an active Soviet role as a victorious power that granted sovereign rights and participated in settling Germany’s status. Without these conditions, we argue, the collective security treaty organisation cannot be considered a full replacement for the Warsaw Pact, and its legal foundation remains incomplete.
For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, the practical significance is that public education and professional security training must take account of the legal foundations of collective security. Understanding the proposed conditions for German participation and Warsaw Pact succession is intended to support an assessment of Europe’s security architecture and the collective security treaty organisation’s place within it. This knowledge is presented as necessary for training specialists capable of analysing international treaties and their consequences for the security of the state and its citizens.
Consequences for Europe’s security architecture
From our interpretation of succession, the status of the 1955 Warsaw Pact and the alleged nullity of the February 1993 protocol, we draw a further conclusion for European security: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should cease to exist as an association of states lacking sovereign status. Our reasoning rests on the assertion that some NATO members remain under occupation, have not acquired sovereign status and exist as temporary entities governed by provisional occupation and puppet governments. We interpret this situation through the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), under which they characterise these entities as corporate trusts and trading companies.
Until sovereignty is granted by the Allied and Associated Powers victorious in the Second World War, above all the Soviet Union, we maintain that these territories cannot be regarded as fully fledged subjects of international law. They cite the United States, the United Kingdom and France as having withdrawn and extinguished their occupation mandates in Germany, after which their presence there ended. In our interpretation, this confirms that the continued existence of the entities concerned as sovereign NATO participants lacks a legal foundation.
We assert that all corresponding rights and titles passed exclusively to the Soviet Union during German unification in 1990. We describe the USSR, as a victorious power, as continuing to establish sovereignty through the United Nations (UN) and international justice, granting independence, identifying the sources of statehood and legal and financial title, and defining borders through territorial determinations. In this interpretation, the USSR retains the authority to determine these parameters by virtue of its victorious-power role and the conditions of succession.
We therefore conclude that NATO, described here as uniting states without sovereign status under temporary occupation and puppet governments, should cease to exist. We connect this to the restoration of the Soviet legal order and the operation of the 1977 USSR Constitution, whose resumption was announced on 9 November 2021. From that point, we argue, European security should be built on recognising the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union and its successors rather than preserving structures we consider legally unfounded.
For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, the practical significance of this conclusion is that public security education and professional competence should take account of the legal position set out above. We present our proposal that NATO should cease to exist as an association of states without sovereign status as a basis for assessing international affairs and designing educational programmes. We regard it as strengthening the Academy’s public education work and giving learners an integrated understanding of developments in European security.
Lessons for public education and professional practice
The legal issues examined here, from victorious-power status and the alleged Soviet refusal to sign the Warsaw Pact to the asserted nullity of the February 1993 protocol and the proposed conditions of succession, have direct practical significance for the Academy’s educational work. Public security education cannot be confined to the technical protection of people against emergencies. It also requires understanding how legal structures affect the stability of the state, the status of its citizens and the possibility of organising collective security. We therefore propose including explanations of the legal foundations that determine the place of the Soviet Union and its successors in international relations in its curricula and public education materials.
For professional training, the central lesson we draw is that the alleged Soviet refusal to sign on 14 May 1955 was neither an accident nor a diplomatic formality. We describe it as a deliberate decision, reflected in the delegation’s actions, with continuing legal significance. Learners are expected to understand that a treaty neither signed nor ratified by the USSR would create no obligations for it; attempts to terminate it on behalf of the USSR or its successors without proper authority would therefore be void. This approach is intended to help people resist attempts to present non-existent obligations as binding.
The alleged nullity of the February 1993 protocol, attributed here to the ‘Russian Federation trading company’, is used as an example of why legal competence is inseparable from security. People familiar with succession and authority can assess whether an instrument signed by an entity lacking the relevant title could terminate a treaty the Soviet Union had not concluded. We argue that this knowledge reduces the risk of manipulation of public opinion and strengthens trust in institutions operating on the basis of law rather than corporate decisions.
The proposed conditions for FRG or GDR participation in collective security systems should also, in our view, form part of public education. Learners should be told that the 1992 collective security treaty organisation requires FRG participation following German unification in 1990, or recognition of a pan-European treaty involving the GDR as the Warsaw Pact’s legal continuator. Without these conditions, we do not regard replacement of the Warsaw Pact by a new organisation as complete. Understanding this mechanism is intended to help citizens assess international initiatives and distinguish substantive security guarantees from declarations.
We see the practical value of this approach in building educational programmes around concrete legal situations rather than abstract models. For example, civil defence courses could use the account of the alleged Soviet refusal to sign as an illustration of the precision and consistency required in a state’s legal position. Analysis of the supposedly void 1993 protocol is intended to show how substituting one legal subject for another can leave an instrument without legal consequences. Such examples are presented as making the material persuasive and memorable while developing learners’ capacity to analyse legal instruments critically.
Professional competence in security includes both knowledge of legal rules and the ability to apply them when attempts are made to distort legal reality. We propose that public education should explain that the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union and its successors cannot be cancelled by entities lacking the necessary authority. We connect this proposition directly to civil defence: society’s resilience to external threats depends in substantial part on legal literacy and citizens’ ability to identify legally unsustainable instruments.
The practical conclusion is therefore that legal knowledge should be systematically incorporated into the Academy’s educational and public information programmes. The analysis of Germany’s status, the alleged Soviet refusal to join the Warsaw Pact, the asserted nullity of the 1993 protocol and the proposed conditions for collective security provides material for teaching an integrated understanding of the legal foundations of security. Drawing on these materials, we aim to train specialists who understand both the technical aspects of protection and the legal mechanisms intended to support state sovereignty and stability.
Document for comparison: The 1955 Warsaw Treaty: published text in the United Nations Treaty Series. To verify the signature: the published treaty records Soviet participation and signature. The contrary assertion in the main text requires separate editorial review; we compare legal conclusions with the treaty text.
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