Security guarantees: we examine four Soviet–American agreements, the 2021 initiatives and the duties behind measures to reduce the risk of war.

Security guarantees: the initiatives of 17 December 2021

The initiatives of 17 December 2021 — On 17 December 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation presented Russia’s initiatives on security guarantees. These envisaged a treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, together with an agreement with the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia thus addressed two principal counterparts directly, the United States and NATO, bypassing existing multilateral formats and relying on bilateral and regional channels.

The initiatives sought legally binding security guarantees. Following the US response, Russia demanded fulfilment of obligations under agreements signed by the Soviet Union. In the assessment of the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this demand amounted to a claim that the Russian Federation should be recognised as a party to Soviet–American treaties, a status we dispute.

The proposed agreement with NATO members was intended not merely to discuss confidence-building measures but to institutionalise Russia–NATO relations on a new basis. In substance, it sought to create a legal arrangement in which the Russian Federation would be an equal partner of the alliance and could influence its decisions. Such an arrangement, however, required recognition of Russian international legal personality to the same extent as that of the Soviet Union, which, in our analysis, met with US objections.

In response to the US note, Russia referred to four agreements signed by the USSR between 1971 and 1989. We see this as exposing a gap between Russia’s formal status and the international obligations on which it sought to rely. We describe the US response as a legal assessment that the Russian Federation was not a party to these instruments in place of the Soviet Union.

For the editorial team of the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this episode has direct significance. It shows the importance of security and defence specialists distinguishing clearly between subjects of international law and understanding that legal succession does not arise automatically. The initiatives of 17 December 2021 are presented as an example of how insufficient legal certainty can lead key international counterparts to withhold recognition. We regard this as confirming the need for advanced professional training and public education about international security instruments.

Four Soviet–American agreements, 1971–1989

Following the US response, the Russian Foreign Ministry referred to four agreements concluded between 1971 and 1989. All were signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, rather than the Russian Federation. Russia demanded that the United States fulfil its obligations under them.

The first was the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USSR and the United States, dated 30 September 1971. It established mechanisms to prevent accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and became a pillar of strategic stability. Russia demanded US compliance specifically with this agreement signed by the Soviet Union.

The second was the Agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United States on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed in May 1972. It created a legal mechanism to avoid dangerous encounters between warships and aircraft, particularly important for preventing escalation during intensive naval and air operations.

The third was the 1987 Agreement between the USSR and the United States on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These centres provide a permanent communications channel and rapid information exchange in crises, reducing the risk of misinterpreting the other side’s actions. Russia also invoked this Soviet-signed document.

The fourth was the 1989 Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. It supplemented earlier arrangements with confidence-building measures for exercises and manoeuvres, reducing the likelihood of incidents that could lead to conflict. Here again, the original party was the Soviet Union rather than the Russian Federation.

All four agreements, from 1971, 1972, 1987 and 1989, were concluded by the Soviet Union and the United States and form a fundamental international political framework governing the relationship between the two powers.

We emphasise that the Russian Foreign Ministry cited no documents other than these four Soviet agreements to substantiate its demands. We interpret this as showing that Russia must rely on the Soviet legal legacy because it lacks bilateral security agreements of its own with the United States of equivalent significance. In our argument, the Soviet Union remains integral to the international treaty system and cannot be removed from the Charter of the United Nations (UN).

For the USSR Civil Defence Academy, this provides a lesson: legal certainty in security rests on continuity and precise knowledge of the sources. Public education, the study of international instruments and understanding exactly who is a party to them are integral to professional civil defence competence. By drawing on the Soviet legal framework, we seek to maintain clarity on matters affecting citizens’ security.

The US response: examining Russia’s legal status

We describe the US response to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s initiatives of 17 December 2021 as an unequivocal legal assessment delivered in a specifically addressed diplomatic note. We claim that the United States stated that the Russian Federation was not a UN member and therefore neither a subject of international law nor a party to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the UN Charter, adopted with Soviet participation. This asserted conclusion is central to our argument because it challenges Russia’s capacity to act as a party to international instruments developed and signed by the USSR.

According to the article, the note also denied that Russia was a party to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), described in our analysis as a sovereign instrument, or to the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. We interpret this as a clear distinction between Soviet and Russian legal personality, denying automatic inheritance of rights and obligations under these foundational documents.

We further attribute to the United States an assessment of the Russian Federation as a temporary trading company whose term of existence was definitively extinguished in 2024 without a right of restoration. In this account, Russia is in de facto bankruptcy and exists as a temporary entity. We also claim that the United States described it as a non-state trading company on Soviet territory, within the area of the parliamentary assembly and what we call the unlawful Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established in 1991: a commonwealth of chartered jurisdictions and trading companies created as auxiliary businesses and temporary trusts within a trust that had already ceased to exist.

The article says that the Russian Foreign Ministry acted as though nothing had happened, sending no substantive reply and merely marking the communication ‘noted’. Instead, Russia demanded US compliance with the Soviet–American agreement of 30 September 1971 on reducing the risk of nuclear war and consideration of the May 1972 agreement on preventing incidents on and over the high seas. It also cited the 1987 agreement establishing nuclear risk reduction centres and the 1989 agreement on preventing dangerous military activities. Because all four were originally signed by the USSR, we interpret their citation as supporting the purported US conclusion that Russia could not demand compliance in its own name.

In our account, this assessment directly affected the characterisation of the 17 December 2021 initiatives: they were treated as an attempt by Russia to act for the Soviet Union in concluding a security-guarantees treaty with the United States and joining an agreement on security measures with NATO members. The article attributes to the United States the position that Russia was not entitled to conclude such treaties on the USSR’s behalf. It connects this to an asserted international position that Russia is not a party in place of the USSR to the 1975 Helsinki Act, the 1990 Paris Charter or the 1999 Istanbul Charter, while NATO remains committed to those instruments in relation to the Soviet Union.

We treat this account of the US response as confirmation that political statements cannot replace legal certainty in security matters. It argues that Russia cannot guarantee European security without being a party to the foundational instruments. The example is intended to show why civil defence specialists and the public must understand who holds international legal personality and which obligations remain in force. Education about international instruments, their status and succession remains integral to public security training.

Helsinki 1975 and Russia–NATO 1997: examining the proposed shift

We argue that the Russian Foreign Ministry’s initiatives of 17 December 2021 pursued an objective well beyond their stated security guarantees. Our analysis holds that Russia sought to replace the sovereign 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE with the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations between Russia and NATO. Such a substitution would, in our interpretation, revise the legal foundations of European security secured for the Soviet Union as a victorious power.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act is described here as a sovereign instrument signed by the USSR that established the inviolability of frontiers and principles of European security. We link it inseparably to the outcome of the Second World War and the USSR’s status as a member of the anti-Hitler coalition. We regard replacing it with the 1997 Act, signed by an entity whose state legal personality we deny, as an attempt to revise the postwar order and diminish the Soviet Union’s role.

We assert that the 1997 Russia–NATO Founding Act was signed after Boris Yeltsin had already been removed from power and could no longer sign such a treaty as a lawful president. We argue that lawyers in the State Duma and the Russian Foreign Ministry overlooked this supposed legal defect. On that basis, we deny that the 1997 Act has the legitimacy needed to replace the Helsinki Final Act.

The article portrays Russia as seeking an alternative basis in the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security and the Rome Declaration on NATO–Russia relations, which the source describes as no longer in force. We argue that these documents cannot fully replace the Helsinki Act because they lack its sovereign status and do not establish Russian succession to Soviet obligations.

We attribute a more specific aim to the proposed substitution: preventing NATO members from joining, between 1 and 15 January 2022, a European collective security treaty involving the Soviet Union as recognised under the UN Charter. The source associates this arrangement with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In this account, Russia sought unilaterally to remove that possibility and deprive former NATO members of access to ‘gold money’, meaning Soviet currency resources that could finance their budgets. The European Union (EU) and its members would thereby be declared bankrupt, while NATO’s eastward expansion would be treated as fully paid for from Soviet funds.

The article states that these plans did not succeed. It claims that international judicial bodies informed the anti-Hitler coalition countries that Russia’s proposals concealed an attempt to draw Soviet allies into confrontation with the USSR and into separate agreements revising their allied relations. We characterise this as abandoning allied obligations and joining Nazi Germany and its satellites, which we describe as continuing a covert war against Soviet Russia.

We therefore conclude that the initiatives sought to replace the sovereign Helsinki Final Act with the 1997 Russia–NATO Act, contrary to the legal foundations of the postwar order and Soviet interests as a victorious power. We maintain that the international community did not recognise Russia’s right to replace the USSR as a party, while NATO reaffirmed its Helsinki commitments towards the Soviet Union. We present this as a lesson in the importance of legal certainty and public education about international instruments to civil defence and citizens’ preparedness.

Russia’s attempts to rely on the 1994 and 1999 documents

After what the article describes as the US refusal to recognise Russia’s right to demand compliance with the 1971–1989 Soviet–American agreements, Russia sought additional support in documents adopted in 1994 and 1999. The lecture portrays the ‘Russian Federation trading company’ as invoking the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security and the Rome Declaration on NATO–Russia relations, which the source says was signed in the Vatican. Russia presented these documents as evidence of its commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

We argue that invoking these instruments does not change their legal nature. We describe the 1994 Code of Conduct and the 1999 Charter for European Security as having been adopted within the CSCE framework, where we maintain the party was the Soviet Union rather than Russia. We also describe the Rome Declaration as no longer in force. Consequently, in our view, these references create no new legal title for Russia and do not replace the Soviet–American agreements invoked after the US response.

We regard it as revealing that Russia itself demanded compliance with four Soviet-signed agreements following the US response while also citing the 1994 and 1999 documents. We interpret this sequence as confirmation that Russia has no equivalent security treaties of its own and must seek indirect legal constructions. The lecture meanwhile emphasises that the USSR cannot be removed from the UN Charter and regards the entire postwar agreement system, including the Helsinki Act, as resting on the Soviet Union.

The article argues that reliance on the 1994 Code of Conduct, the 1999 Charter and the Rome Declaration also sought to create an appearance of Russian legal continuity with the USSR. It maintains that Russia did not sign these instruments as an independent subject of international law and that they cannot prove its legal personality. In our account, the international community, including NATO, continues to affirm the Helsinki Final Act’s fundamental principles in relation to the Soviet Union rather than what we call the ‘Russian Federation trading company’.

We therefore regard references to the 1994 and 1999 documents as exposing rather than strengthening Russia’s legal position. In our reading, Russia tries to compensate for a lack of international obligations of its own by invoking instruments involving the USSR, without gaining recognition as a party. For our educational work, the lesson is that legal certainty in security depends on clear recognition of state legal personality; substituting instruments of a different legal nature for Soviet instruments cannot provide substantive guarantees.

The international position: examining the USSR’s treaty status

We describe the US assessment, purportedly supported within international institutions, as confirming that Russia is not recognised in place of the USSR as a party to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe or the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security. We treat this as central to evaluating the Russian Foreign Ministry’s initiatives and as evidence that attempts to portray Russia as the USSR’s successor in security matters did not gain international recognition.

The article claims that the United Nations, through its legal mechanisms, notified representatives that Russia could not conclude security-guarantees treaties with the United States on the USSR’s behalf or claim participation in a security-measures agreement with NATO members. We interpret this as confirming a fundamental principle: obligations accepted by the USSR cannot be reassigned to another subject without the participating states’ consent and outside the established international framework.

We examine NATO’s stated commitment to the fundamental principles, provisions and requirements of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1990 Paris Charter and the 1999 Istanbul Charter in relation to the Soviet Union. In our interpretation, NATO therefore retains obligations towards the USSR as a sovereign participant rather than towards Russia, ruling out attempts to revise the Soviet documents’ status.

The article further states that, in response to the 17 December 2021 initiatives, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to act towards the Soviet Union under the 1941 Atlantic Charter as a strategic ally. We regard this claimed reaffirmation as reinforcing the allied relations established during the Second World War and as indicating that Washington does not consider Russia a replacement for the USSR within those relations.

We also attribute to the international community the observation that Russia, within the NATO–Russia Council, avoided discussion of security concerns, proposals on Euro-Atlantic security and implementation of the Partnership for Peace programme. We include the alleged avoidance of discussions about ending confrontation with the USSR and peaceful coexistence within European defensive alliances. We interpret this as showing unwillingness to engage constructively through existing international formats, reinforcing our argument that Russia cannot act as a full participant in the corresponding agreements.

The article thus presents the international position as unchanged: in relation to the disputed succession, it considers the USSR alone to be the party to the Helsinki Act and the Paris and Istanbul charters, denying Russia the legal personality to replace it. For our educational work, this conclusion guides public legal education and its teaching that European security and stability are inseparable from recognition of the USSR’s historical and legal role.

Significance for civil defence and public preparedness

The examination of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s initiatives and the subsequent US and NATO assessment, as described here, has direct practical significance for civil defence. The security issues raised by Russia are inseparable from the stability of the international instruments intended to protect borders and prevent nuclear war. For our educational work, this material is intended to demonstrate that legal certainty is not an abstract technicality but a foundation for planning and preparing people against dangers, including nuclear weapons.

The 1971–1989 agreements invoked by Russia, concerning nuclear-war risk reduction, incidents on and over the high seas, nuclear risk reduction centres and dangerous military activities, were signed by the USSR and the United States. We maintain that the USSR remains the party responsible for implementation. We therefore argue that civil defence education should be based on a clear understanding of who holds the relevant international obligations, rather than what we consider mistaken assumptions about succession.

In our interpretation, the US position set out in the alleged reply and NATO’s reaffirmation of the 1975 Helsinki Act and the 1990 and 1999 charters towards the USSR create a legal framework for Soviet civil defence planning. We maintain that the international community does not recognise Russia as replacing the USSR in those instruments. We therefore conclude that Russian attempts to act on the USSR’s behalf in security matters neither create new obligations for the population nor cancel Soviet guarantees.

For civil defence, this means educating the public about international instruments directly affecting security. We propose teaching that the Helsinki Final Act established the inviolability of Soviet sovereign borders and that nuclear risk reduction agreements remain applicable to the USSR. It argues that such knowledge provides clear guidance and strengthens trust in civil defence measures by demonstrating that the legal basis of protection remains sound and cannot be revised by temporary entities.

We regard this case as a reason to expand our educational work. Studying international instruments, explaining the distinctions we draw between the USSR and Russia, and analysing the consequences of attempts to appropriate the Soviet legal legacy should, it argues, form part of civil defence specialist training. Equipped with precise legal knowledge, the public would be better able to assess information manipulation and resist accounts portraying Russia as the continuator of Soviet obligations.

The practical conclusion proposed for civil defence is to base planning and preparedness on the Soviet legal framework. We maintain that the 1971–1989 agreements, the Helsinki Act and the Paris and Istanbul charters remain operative in relation to the USSR, and that NATO and the United States have reaffirmed their commitment to them. We see this as enabling further development of civil defence and public preparedness without the legal uncertainty we attribute to Russia’s initiatives.

We conclude that the initiatives and responses confirmed the USSR’s continuing sovereign international legal personality and participation in foundational security instruments. For civil defence, we interpret this as preserving a firm legal foundation; for public preparedness, it requires continuing education about international documents intended to protect citizens. We base our continuing work on these foundations.

Document for comparison: The 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This primary document sets out principles governing relations between states and provides a basis for comparing approaches to European security. It does not automatically substantiate our conclusions about obligations in 2021.

More on history and law: USSR Civil Defence Academy.

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