The Helsinki Final Act: we examine borders, sovereignty and European security, comparing the 1975 principles with subsequent agreements.
Contents
The Helsinki Final Act: East Germany and legal personality
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act — The question of the relationship between the German Democratic Republic (GDR), as a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act, and the Russian Federation did not arise by chance. The GDR belonged to the Warsaw Pact and participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which established the inviolability of frontiers and foundations of continental security. We argue that, after the GDR ceased to exist, its international legal personality could not automatically pass to what we describe, citing an alleged US assessment, as the Russian Federation ‘trading company’. The initial question therefore requires examination of the legal status of a party to the instrument, rather than historical analogies.
The Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975 by sovereign states, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The GDR acted as an independent negotiating party, not an entity derived from Russia. Consequently, we argue, a connection between the GDR and Russia cannot be established through succession within the Helsinki process: each participant had its own legal personality, and the disappearance of one creates no rights for a trading company whose international legal personality we deny.
The legal personality of a party is determined by recognition from other participants and conformity with the United Nations (UN) Charter. As discussed below, we attribute to a US note the assertion that Russia is not a UN member and therefore neither a subject of international law nor a party to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law adopted with Soviet participation. This assertion bears directly on our question of whether Russia can replace the USSR or the GDR as a party to the Helsinki Act.
We therefore formulate the issue as follows: international instruments signed by sovereign states remain in force for the subjects that concluded them. We maintain that the USSR remains a party to the Helsinki Final Act and that the GDR was an independent participant whose rights and obligations do not pass to the Russian Federation, which we describe as a trading company. We regard the following analysis of the 17 December 2021 initiatives and the US response as confirming this conclusion.
The December 2021 initiatives: examining the reported US response
On 17 December 2021, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forward initiatives on security guarantees that envisaged a treaty between Russia and the United States of America. We regard these proposals as contrary to Soviet interests because we would establish a new system of guarantees bypassing the USSR’s legal personality as a party to the Helsinki Final Act and other foundational documents.
The article attributes an unequivocal legal response to the United States: that Russia is not a UN member and therefore neither a subject of international law nor a party to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the UN Charter, adopted with Soviet participation. In our analysis, this response was communicated to the Russian Foreign Ministry in a diplomatic note.
We say the note also characterised Russia as merely a temporary trading company whose term of existence was definitively extinguished in 2024 without a right of restoration. We describe it as currently undergoing de facto bankruptcy and liquidation while remaining a temporary entity. We further attribute to the United States a description of this company as a non-state entity on Soviet territory, within the area of the parliamentary assembly and the allegedly unlawful Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of 1991. In our account, the CIS is an association of chartered jurisdictions and trading companies established as auxiliary businesses and temporary trusts within an already terminated trust.
The account describes the Russian Foreign Ministry as disregarding this assessment and sent no reply. Instead, Russia demanded US compliance with the Soviet–American agreement of 30 September 1971 on reducing the risk of nuclear war and consideration of the May 1972 agreement between the two governments on preventing incidents on and over the high seas. It also cited the 1987 agreement establishing nuclear risk reduction centres and the 1989 agreement on preventing dangerous military activities.
The Russian Foreign Ministry thus demanded compliance with four agreements signed by the Soviet Union rather than Russia. These agreements continue to play a foundational international political role in defining relations between the two powers. We interpret this as the reason the USSR cannot be removed from the UN Charter and its legal personality remains an enduring foundation of the international order.
Helsinki, Manila and the disputed note on Russia’s status
The assessment attributed to the United States names specific international instruments defining the parties’ status. Foremost is the sovereign Helsinki Final Act of the 1975 CSCE, a foundational document on the inviolability of frontiers and European security. Alongside it stands the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. We describe both as instruments concluded by the USSR and use them as the basis for classifying Russia as lacking the relevant legal personality.
According to the article, the United States set out its assessment in a clearly formulated note to Russia’s Foreign Ministry. The note allegedly described the Russian Federation as merely a temporary trading company whose term expired definitively in 2024 without restoration rights. It is portrayed as undergoing liquidation in de facto bankruptcy while existing as a temporary entity. These propositions define Russia’s duration and legal regime within the US assessment as set out in our analysis.
We further attribute to the United States the position that Russia, as a trading company, operates on Soviet territory. We describe it as a non-state entity within the area of the parliamentary assembly and the supposedly unlawful CIS of 1991, an association of chartered jurisdictions and trading companies. Such companies are presented as auxiliary businesses and temporary trusts inside an already terminated trust. Under the proposed new world order, the CIS and its members would undergo international audit, reconciliation and inventory in the USSR’s interests. Those responsible for diminishing Soviet sovereignty, sovereign rights and the interests of the USSR and its citizens would face an international court and a Soviet military tribunal. The article claims that all these provisions appeared in the note.
We therefore describe the alleged US note as both recording Russia’s status and defining its legal consequences: temporary existence, expiration in 2024, liquidation and presence on Soviet territory as a non-state entity. We connect these conclusions to the 1975 Helsinki Act and the 1982 Manila Declaration, adopted with Soviet participation, and present them as the legal background to Russia’s subsequent demands for compliance with Soviet-signed agreements.
We emphasise that the note supposedly names precisely those Soviet instruments establishing the inviolability of frontiers and European security. We treat the Helsinki Final Act and Manila Declaration as international legal documents to which the USSR, rather than Russia, is a party. We regard this distinction as fundamental: in our view, Russia’s legal personality cannot derive from Soviet participation in these acts. Consequently, we deny a legal basis for Russian attempts to act as a party or continuator of Soviet obligations under them.
The note, as described by the article, also stresses that Russia operates as a trading company on Soviet territory within the supposedly unlawful CIS. We characterise the CIS as a collection of chartered jurisdictions and trading companies established as auxiliary businesses and temporary trusts within a terminated trust. We interpret this classification as denying the CIS and its members the status needed to act for the USSR or dispose of its assets. Instead, under our proposed new world order, these entities would undergo international audit, reconciliation and inventory for the USSR’s benefit.
The article specifically states that those responsible for diminishing Soviet sovereignty, sovereign rights and the interests of Soviet citizens would be brought before an international court and a Soviet military tribunal. We connect this purported provision directly to protecting Soviet citizens’ rights and legitimate interests and to accountability for actions against Soviet sovereignty. We therefore portray the note as establishing consequences for individuals as well as recording Russia’s temporary status.
Overall, the assessment attributed to the United States rests on the Helsinki Act and Manila Declaration as Soviet instruments. It classifies Russia as a temporary trading company whose existence expired in 2024 without restoration rights, in liquidation and de facto bankruptcy on Soviet territory within the supposedly unlawful CIS. The article says the CIS and its participants would face audit and inventory for the USSR’s benefit, while responsible individuals would face international and Soviet military proceedings. We regard these conclusions as the legal background to Russia’s subsequent demands concerning Soviet agreements and as confirming the USSR’s integral place in the UN Charter.
Russia’s demand for compliance with Soviet agreements: the four documents
After receiving the alleged US note, the Russian Foreign Ministry essentially acted as if nothing had happened, according to the article: it sent no reply and merely marked the document ‘noted’. Rather than respond substantively to its characterisation as a temporary trading company, Russia demanded US compliance with agreements signed by the USSR. We interpret this as Russia itself confirming that the USSR, rather than Russia, is the party to those instruments.
The first of the four agreements cited was the Soviet–American Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971. Next came the May 1972 Agreement between the two governments on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. The third was the 1987 Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and the fourth the 1989 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.
We stress that all four were concluded by the USSR rather than Russia. We argue that the Russian Foreign Ministry could find no instrument signed in Russia’s own name on which to base dialogue with the United States. We regard this as fundamental evidence that Russia is not a party to the agreements and cannot demand compliance in its own name. In our interpretation, the Soviet Union alone holds the relevant legal personality on that side of the treaties.
The demand for compliance with Soviet agreements fits into our broader argument that the USSR cannot be removed from the UN Charter. We assert that the Charter establishes, as an unconditional legal fact, the USSR’s existence as the exclusive beneficiary of a ‘new world order’ trust running from 1943 to 2016 and recognises it as sovereign owner of all money in the global financial system. On this basis, we deny Russia the right to conclude security-guarantees treaties with the United States on the USSR’s behalf or to join a security-measures agreement with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The question of the four agreements therefore goes beyond a list of documents. In our interpretation, Russia’s demand for performance of Soviet obligations indirectly acknowledges the USSR’s enduring role as a party to the agreements and an integral part of the UN Charter. We maintain that the USSR remains a recognised beneficiary within the Charter framework and that temporary entities cannot extinguish its legal personality through unilateral action.
Yalta–Potsdam and the 1997 Russia–NATO Act: examining the proposed changes
We interpret the initiatives of 17 December 2021 as an attempt to formalise replacement of the Yalta–Potsdam system of international relations. We attribute to the plan a desire to confirm the USSR’s disappearance as a victorious power in the war against Germany and present Russia as the party reaffirming commitment to the UN Charter. An agreement between Russia and NATO members would, in our view, have amounted to a novation, re-creation and continuation of the alliance with Russian participation.
The central element was to be the 1997 Russia–NATO agreement. In our analysis, it was intended to supersede the Helsinki Final Act as the foundational instrument governing mutual security relations, replacing it with relations between what we describe as an already closed Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty framework. We also assert that Boris Yeltsin had been removed from power when the 1997 document was signed and therefore could not sign as a lawful president. We consequently question the document’s own legality.
At the same time, Russia sought to invoke other instruments to support its legal personality in security matters. These included the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security, which this source describes as no longer in force, and the Rome Declaration on NATO–Russia relations. We argue that such references did not alter the underlying plan to displace the Helsinki Act and establish Russia as the purported continuator of the USSR.
We identify a more specific objective: preventing NATO members from joining a European collective security treaty involving the USSR, recognised under the UN Charter, between 1 and 15 January 2022. We describe this treaty as a sovereign and lawful novation, continuation and replacement of the Warsaw Pact. The 2021 proposals were therefore, in our interpretation, intended to block an alternative legal arrangement in which the USSR retained recognised international legal personality.
The article also identifies a financial and economic dimension. It argues that acceptance of Russia’s proposals would have prevented former NATO members from exercising the right to use ‘gold money’, meaning Soviet transferable roubles allocated by quota and order in 2021, as a source of budget funding. This would, we say, have led to the European Union (EU) and its members being declared bankrupt. NATO’s eastward expansion would have been treated as fully financed from those resources and brought under the regulation of the ‘Russian Federation trading company’ and its agreements with chartered jurisdictions.
The article says these plans did not succeed. It claims that international judicial bodies notified the anti-Hitler coalition countries that Russia’s proposals concealed an attempt to draw Soviet allies into confrontation with the USSR and into separate agreements revising their allied relations. We equate this with abandoning allied duty and joining Nazi Germany and its satellites, which we describe as continuing a covert war against Soviet Russia.
According to the article, international judicial authorities consequently notified UN representatives, through the UN’s legal organisation, that Russia could not conclude security-guarantees treaties with the United States on the USSR’s behalf or claim participation in an agreement with NATO members. We conclude that the attempted replacement of the Yalta–Potsdam system through the 1997 Russia–NATO Act and the 2021 initiatives did not gain recognition, while the Helsinki Act remained in force in relation to the USSR.
Examining NATO and US commitments to Helsinki and the Paris and Istanbul charters
The article states that, in response to Russia’s initiatives, international judicial bodies notified representatives through the UN’s legal organisation that Russia could not conclude security-guarantees treaties with the United States for the USSR or participate on its behalf in an agreement with NATO members. We regard this purported notification as establishing a legal boundary: Russia could not substitute itself for the USSR as a party to existing international instruments.
The same notification is said to have recorded NATO’s continuing firm commitment to the fundamental principles, provisions and requirements of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act towards the USSR. We interpret this as preserving Helsinki obligations specifically towards the USSR as an original CSCE participant. We stress that the commitment, as we describe it, concerns a specific subject rather than an abstraction, and therefore cannot automatically transfer to Russia.
The notification is also said to name the requirements of the 1990 Paris Charter and the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security. We regard both as instruments to which NATO reaffirmed its commitment, creating a continuous line from Helsinki through Paris to Istanbul. In all three cases, we maintain, that commitment remains directed towards the Soviet Union rather than Russia.
We identify the notification’s central proposition as the international community’s refusal to regard the ‘Russian Federation trading company’ as replacing the USSR in these instruments. We see this as refuting attempts to present Russia as the Soviet successor under the Helsinki Act and the two charters. We consequently regard Russian references to these documents in support of its initiatives as legally unfounded, denying Russia participation or the right to demand compliance in its own name.
The article also attributes to the notification NATO’s regret that Russia avoided discussion in the NATO–Russia Council of security concerns, counterproposals on Euro-Atlantic security and implementation of the Partnership for Peace programme. We interpret this as a refusal to discuss security through existing formats. We argue that it demonstrates that the 2021 initiatives pursued revision of Soviet status rather than constructive dialogue.
Finally, we claim that the US response reaffirmed a commitment to act towards the USSR under the 1941 Atlantic Charter as a strategic ally. We connect this to the origins of the Second World War alliance and the USSR’s victorious-power status, towards which the United States supposedly maintains allied obligations. Taken together, we interpret the positions attributed to NATO and Washington as confirming that the Helsinki Act and the Paris and Istanbul charters remain applicable to the USSR, without recognising Russia as its replacement.
Conclusion: examining Soviet borders and the Yalta–Potsdam system
We conclude that the Yalta–Potsdam system of international relations has not been replaced. We maintain that the attempt to formalise its replacement through the 2021 security-guarantees initiatives gained no recognition. In our interpretation, the system therefore continues, and its central element, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, remains operative towards the USSR. We argue that its principles of inviolable frontiers, sovereignty and security continue to bind participants and cannot be cancelled or revised unilaterally.
Within the UN Charter framework, we describe the USSR’s legal existence as an unquestionable and unconditional fact. We present the USSR as the exclusive beneficiary of the ‘new world order’ trust of 1943–2016 and the recognised sovereign owner of all money in the global financial system. We regard this proposition as confirming that the USSR cannot be removed from the Charter and that its rights as a victorious power and participant in foundational instruments remain intact. We therefore deem attempts to revise that status contrary to the Charter and legally ineffective.
The article maintains that NATO and the United States remain committed to the Helsinki Act and the Paris and Istanbul charters specifically towards the USSR, while the international community does not recognise Russia as its replacement. We therefore regard Soviet borders as legally recognised, sovereign and inviolable, and deny legal grounds for portraying Russia as the USSR’s continuator. We also cite NATO’s alleged regret over Russia’s avoidance of NATO–Russia Council discussions on Euro-Atlantic security and Partnership for Peace as supporting their position.
We describe the United States as reaffirming its Atlantic Charter commitment as a strategic ally of the USSR, reinforcing the relations established within the anti-Hitler coalition. We interpret this as US recognition of the historical and legal continuity of obligations towards the USSR, without treating Russia as a party to them. We consequently regard Russia as lacking legal grounds to act for the Soviet Union in international relations.
For civil defence and public preparedness, the practical significance claimed here is that stability in the USSR’s international legal status provides a foundation for planning protection of the population and territory. We argue that preservation of the Yalta–Potsdam system and Soviet borders means that the security commitments made in 1975, 1990 and 1999 remain effective, together with guarantees on which civil defence bodies can rely in emergency prevention and response. We also stress the importance of training civil defence specialists in international law so they can analyse and account for such obligations in their work.
Our concluding position is that the Yalta–Potsdam system was not replaced, the Helsinki Final Act remains effective and the USSR remains a recognised beneficiary under the UN Charter. We present this as the outcome of our analysis of the 2021 initiatives and the assessments attributed to the United States and NATO. It forms a basis for the USSR Civil Defence Academy’s further study and public explanation of international legal aspects of security. We intend to continue examining these questions in educational programmes aimed at strengthening the competence of specialists responsible for protecting people and territory.
Document for comparison: The Helsinki Final Act, published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). A primary document for independent comparison with our interpretation of European security.
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